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One of the fundamental purposes of futures contracts is to provide price discovery in the “cash” or
“spot” markets. Those selling or buying commodities in the “spot” markets rely on futures prices to
judge amounts to charge or pay for the delivery of a commodity.
Since their creation in the agricultural context decades ago, it has been widely known that, unless
properly regulated, futures markets are easily subject to distorting the economic fundamentals of
price discovery (i.e., cause the paying of unnecessarily higher or lower prices) through excessive
speculation, fraud, or manipulation. The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) has long been judged
to prevent those abuses.
Accordingly, prior to the hasty and last minute passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), “all futures activity [was] confined by law (and eventually to criminal
activity) to [CFTC regulated] exchanges alone.” Johnson & Hazen, Derivatives Reg. (2008 Cum.
Supp.) at p. 27.
At the behest of Enron, the CFMA authorized the “stunning” change to the CEA to allow the option
of trading energy commodities on deregulated “exempt commercial markets,” i.e., exchanges
exempt from CFTC, or any other federal or state, oversight, thereby rejecting the contrary 1999
advice of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. Id. This is called “the Enron
Loophole.”
Two prominent and detailed bipartisan studies of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
(“SPI”) staff represent what is now conventional wisdom: hedge funds, large banks and energy
companies, and wealthy individuals have used “exempt commercial energy futures markets” to
drive up needlessly the price of energy commodities over what economic fundamentals dictate,
adding, for example, what the SPI estimated to be @ $20-$30 per barrel to the price of crude oil.
The SPI staff and others have identified the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) of Atlanta, Georgia
as an unregulated facility upon which considerable exempt energy futures trading is done. For
purposes of facilitating exempt natural gas futures, ICE is deemed a U.S. “exempt commercial
market” under the Enron Loophole. For purposes of its facilitating U.S. WTI crude oil futures, the
CFTC, by informal staff action, deems ICE to be a U.K. entity not subject to direct CFTC regulation
even though ICE maintains U.S. headquarters and trading infrastructure, facilitating, inter alia, @
30% of trades in U.S. WTI futures. That staff informal action may be terminated instantly by the
CFTC under existing law.
Virtually all parties now agree the Enron Loophole must be repealed. The simplest way to repeal it
is to add two words to the Act’s definition of “exempt commodity” so it reads: an exempt
commodity does “not include an agriculture or energy commodity;” and two words to 7 U.S.C. § 7
(e) to make clear that “agricultural and energy commodities” must trade on regulated markets. An
“energy commodity” definition must be then be added to include crude oil, natural gas, heating oil,
gasoline, heating oil, metals, etc. In the absence of quick CFTC action permitted by law, the statute
should also be amended to forbid an exchange from being deemed an unregulated foreign entity if
its trading affiliate or trading infrastructure is in the U.S.; or if it trades a U.S. delivered contract
within the U.S. that significantly affects price discovery.
Legislative proposals now seriously under consideration are problematic. They do not address ICE’s
exemption from U.S. regulation as a “U.K.” entity; and they put the burden on the CFTC and the
public to prove in complicated contract-by-contract bureaucratic proceedings, that regulation is
needed for an individual energy contract, rather for an exempt trading facility. It will also lead to
traders using regulatory arbitrage to move to unregulated contracts not found to be subject to
regulation. The CFTC will always being trying to catch up to uncovered speculative and harmful
trading.
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Introduction
My name is Michael Greenberger.
I want to thank the subcommittee for inviting me to testify on the important issue
that is the subject of today’s hearings.
After nearly 24 years in private legal practice, I served as the Director of the
Division of Trading and Markets (“T&M”) at the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) from September 1997 to September 1999. In that capacity, I
supervised approximately 135 CFTC personnel in CFTC offices in DC, New York,
Chicago, and Minneapolis, including lawyers and accountants who were engaged in
overseeing the Nation’s futures exchanges. During my tenure at the CFTC, I worked
extensively on regulatory issues concerning exchange traded energy derivatives, the legal
status of over-the-counter (“OTC”) energy derivatives, and the CFTC authorization of
computerized trading of foreign exchange derivative products on computer terminals in
the United States.
While at the CFTC, I also served on the Steering Committee of the President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets (“PWG”). In that capacity, I drafted, and oversaw
the drafting of, portions of the April 1999 PWG Report entitled “Hedge Funds, Leverage,
and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” which recommended to Congress
regulatory actions to be taken in the wake of the near collapse of the Long Term Capital
Management (“LTCM”) hedge fund, including Appendix C to that report which outlined
the CFTC’s role in responding to that near collapse. As a member of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions’ (“IOSCO”) Hedge Fund Task Force, I also
participated in the drafting of the November 1999 IOSCO Report of its Technical
Committee relating to the LTCM episode: “Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged
Institutions.”
After a two year stint between 1999 and 2001 as the Principal Deputy Associate
Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice, I began service as a Professor at the
University of Maryland School of Law. At the law school, I have, inter alia, focused my
attention on futures and OTC derivatives trading, including academic writing and
speaking on these subjects. I have also served as a media commentator on the role of
unregulated financial derivatives in recent major financial scandals, including the failure
of Enron; the now infamous Western electricity market manipulation of 2001-2002
caused by the market manipulation of Enron and others; the collapse of one of the
Nation’s largest futures commission merchants, Refco, Inc., the then eighth largest
futures commission merchant in the 14th largest bankruptcy; the collapse of the hedge
fund, Amaranth Trading Advisers, LLC.; and the present subprime mortgage meltdown,
which is substantially premised upon OTC derivatives contracts deregulated by statute in
2000 by Congress.
Besides addressing these issues in a variety of commercial and financial
regulatory law courses, I have designed and now teach a course entitled “Futures,
2

Options, and Derivatives,” in which the United States energy futures trading markets are
featured as a case study of the way in which unregulated or poorly regulated futures and
derivatives trading cause dysfunctions within those markets and within the U.S. economy
as a whole, including causing the needlessly high prices which energy consumers now
pay because of excessive speculation and illegal manipulation and fraud within those
markets.
The Soaring Price of Energy Commodities Despite Stable Supplies
In examining the questions relating to the high price of energy to American
consumers, it is useful to remember that as of January 2002, the cost of crude oil was @
$18 a barrel;1 by the end of 2005, it had risen to @ $50;2 and, as of today, the price,
which has recently flirted with a record high $100 a barrel, now rests at @ $88 per
barrel.3 In early 2004, the average retail price of gasoline of which crude is a major
component was @ $1.50 per gallon.4 As of today, the average price of gas is slightly
below $3 per gallon, with substantial speculation that it will soon soar to over $4.00.5
Since March 31, 2007, or the “close” of last winter’s heating season, the wholesale price
of heating oil has risen 32%, from $1.88 per gallon to a record high of $2.77 per gallon.6
As I show below, these soaring price rises continue despite the fact that supplies of oil
both in the U.S. and worldwide remain relatively stable.7
Moreover, as recently as January 2002, the spot price of natural gas was
approximately $3 MMBtu.8 By December 2005, the cost of natural gas had “float[ed] to a
[record] high near $14 MMBtu.”9 Following a Republican sponsored floor amendment
that would have imposed new regulatory restrictions on the deregulated natural gas
futures market, the price of natural gas quickly dropped by one third.10 By late July,
2006, the futures price of natural gas to be delivered in October 2006 had risen to a yearly
high of $8.45 MMBtu. After Amaranth collapsed in September 2006, the futures price
dropped “to just under $4.80 per MMBtu . . ., the lowest level for that contract in two and
1

Jad Mouawad & Heather Timmons, Trading Frenzy Adds to Jump in Price of Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2006, at A1.
2
Id.
3
Commodities & Futures Overview, Crude Oil Lt Sweet Pit (Nymex) January 2008, WALL STREET J.
ONLINE, available at http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_commodities.html.
4
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION IN RISING OIL AND GAS PRICES: A NEED TO PUT THE COP
BACK ON THE BEAT 10 (June 27, 2006) [hereinafter Permanent Subcomm. June 2006 Report].
5
Clifford Krauss, Unseasonably Higher, Gas Prices Add to Strain on U.S. Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/business/08gas.html?fta=y.
6
See U.S. No. 2 Heating Oil Wholesale/Resale Price, Petroleum Navigator, ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/whowsus4w.htm.
7
See API Energy Data: Weekly Snapshot, WALL STREET J. ONLINE, Dec. 7, 2007, available at
http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3020-oilstats.html.
8
Henry Hub Natural Gas Daily Spot Prices: 2001-2007 (Dec. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-gas/overview/2007/ngas-ovr-hh-pr-rg.pdf [hereinafter Market
Overview] (from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)).
9
151 CONG REC. H11553-01 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Pombo).
10
See, e.g., AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, LONG-TERM STRATEGIES ARE KEY IN ACHIEVING STABLE NATURAL
GAS PRICES 6 (2006), available at http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/NaturalGasPriceOutlook306.pdf.
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one-half years. . . The Electric Power Research Institute described this price collapse as
‘stunning . . . one of the steepest declines ever.’ . . . Throughout this period, the market
fundamentals of supply and demand were largely unchanged.”11 As recently as the end of
June, 2007, natural gas rose to over $10 per MMBtu.12 On June 25, 2007, the
Congressional investigations of natural gas futures dysfunction began in earnest with
attendant discussions of new regulatory structures, including aggressive FERC
investigations.13 The price therefore spiked at the end of June and today is at the lower,
but still relatively high, price of about $7 per MMBtu.14
The Two Bipartisan PSI Staff Reports on Distortions in Energy Markets Caused by
Unregulated Futures Trading
The 2006 PSI Bipartisan Staff Report on Crude Oil and Natural Gas Speculation.
In June 2006, the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (“PSI”) of the
Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee issued a bipartisan report
making clear that the dramatic increases in commodity prices described above were not
attributable (as conventional wisdom insisted at the time) on problems of supply/
demand. Instead, price spikes were caused by dysfunctionality in the recently deregulated
energy futures markets and in the maladministration by the CFTC of its no action process
pertaining to purported “foreign boards of trade.” In that report, The Role of Market
Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat, 15 the
staff showed, for example, that “U.S. oil inventories are at an eight year high and OECD
inventories are at a 20 year high,”16 and that the “last time crude oil inventories were that
high in May 1998 – at about 347 million barrels – the price of crude oil was about $15 a
barrel.”17
The staff noted that, in the analysis of one of the Nation’s leading energy
economists, Philip Verleger, the “reason for this divergence [between adequate supplies
and soaring prices] is that purchases of long-term crude oil futures contracts have pushed
up the longer-term futures prices by so much that it is more profitable for [speculators] to
store the oil and then sell it at a later date than sell it today, even at record spot prices.”18
The 2006 Report concluded that with the then price of oil at @ $70 per barrel (as opposed
to @ $90 now), anywhere from $20-30 of that price was caused by excessive speculation
or manipulation, rather than by supply/demand.19
11

STAFF OF THE S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON EXCESSIVE
SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET 1-2 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Report].
12
Commodities & Futures Overview: Nat. Gas Henry Hub Pit (Nymex) January 2008, WALL STREET J.
ONLINE, available at http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_commodities.html [hereinafter Nat. Gas
Henry Hub Pit].
13
See generally 2007 Report, supra note 11; Statement of FERC Chairman Joseph T. Kelliher, Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of House Comm. On Energy and Commerce, Dec. 12, 2007.
14
Nat. Gas Henry Hub Pit, supra note 12.
15
Permanent Subcomm. June 2006 Report, supra note 4.
16
Id. at 1.
17
Id. at 2.
18
Id. at 25.
19
Id. at 2, 23.
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In this vein, Abdalla al-Badri, OPEC’s secretary general announced early this
month that OPEC will not lift oil production to reduce prices charged to consumers out of
the futility such an action, saying: “The market is not controlled by supply and demand
. . . It is totally controlled by speculators who consider oil as a financial asset.”20
The June 2006 bipartisan staff report recommended ending the deregulation of
energy futures contracts brought about by the so-called Enron Loophole passed in
December 200021 and having the CFTC alter staff no action letters that now allow U.S.owned exchanges trading U.S. crude oil futures in the U.S. to remain regulated by British
regulators under a regulatory scheme that fails to protect the American consumers from
excessive speculation and manipulation of “spot” crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil
prices.22
The 2007 PSI Bipartisan Staff Report on Excessive Natural Gas Speculation. The
authors of that June 2006 Report were quick to recognize, that that report was based only
on publicly available information and that the staff therefore had “gaps in available
market data.”23 Those gaps were eliminated with regard to natural gas futures trading in
the bipartisan report released by the PSI staff on June 25, 2007: “Excessive Speculation in
the Natural Gas Market.”24 That report is the result of accessing all encompassing data
pertaining to the natural gas futures and derivatives markets, including the analysis of
“millions of natural gas transactions from trading records” and “numerous interviews of
natural gas market participants.”25
That bipartisan 2007 Report is not only a thorough analysis of the destabilization
in the natural gas markets caused by a lack of adequate regulation; it is the most complete
and scholarly description of the way in which futures and derivatives markets operate as a
whole and the critical role appropriate regulation plays in allowing those markets to
operate consistent with basic free market principles.
The 2007 Report on natural gas speculation makes clear that the failure to
regulate these markets properly has distorted and sabotaged free market principles. It has
cut those markets off from the moorings of economic fundamentals. It has turned them
into nothing more than casinos serving neither those who need them to hedge for
commercial purposes nor those who wish to speculate based on honest fundamentals.26
20

Robin Pagnamenta, OPEC rejects rise in output but prepares for review, TIMESONLINE, Dec. 6, 2007,
available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/
article3007105.
21
See 2007 Report, supra note 11, at 8, 119-20.
22
Permanent Subcomm. June 2006 Report, supra note 4, at 49.
23
Id. at 6.
24
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET, (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter June 25
Report].
25
Id. at 2.
26
Today’s report is also fully corroborated by a sophisticated economic study conducted during the 2006
natural gas futures market destabilization period. See ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & NAM D. PHAM, AN ANALYSIS
OF SPOT AND FUTURES PRICES FOR NATURAL GAS: THE ROLES OF ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS, MARKET
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The 2007 PSI Report’s Basic Findings. The basic findings of the SPI 2007
Report on natural gas speculation are:
First, even though these markets were established principally to afford
commercial hedging, the natural gas futures markets from sometime in 2004 through at
least mid-September 2006 were overwhelmingly dominated by a single institution, which
had no commercial stake in natural gas. The staff dramatically describes the dominance
of a single hedge fund, Amaranth, as follows:
“[T]he CFTC defines a ‘large trader’ . . . in the natural gas market as a
trader who holds at least 200 contracts; . . . Amaranth held as many as 100,000
natural gas contracts in a single month, representing 1 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas, or 5 % of the natural gas used in the entire United States in a year. At times
Amaranth controlled 40% of all of the outstanding contracts on NYMEX [(one of
the two major exchanges on which natural gas is traded in the U.S.)] for the
winter season (October 2006 through March 2007), including as much as 75% of
the outstanding contracts to deliver natural gas in November 2006.”27
Second, Amaranth’s dominance of this market caused extensive price volatility.
As recently as January 2002, the spot price of natural gas was approximately $3
MMBtu.28 By late July, 2006, the futures price of the October 2006 natural gas contract
was at a yearly high of $8.45 MMBtu. After Amaranth collapsed in September 2006, the
futures price dropped “to just under $4.80 per MMBtu . . ., the lowest level for that
contract in two and one-half years. . . The Electric Power Research Institute described
this price collapse as ‘stunning . . . one of the steepest declines ever.’ . . . Throughout this
period, the market fundamentals of supply and demand were largely unchanged.”29
Third, the staff makes clear that “[t]he price of natural gas directly affects every
segment of the U.S. economy, from individual households to small businesses to large
industries. ‘Natural gas is used in over sixty million homes. Additionally, natural gas is
used in 78% of restaurants, 73% of lodging facilities, 51% of hospitals, 59% of offices,
and 58% of retail buildings.’”30
Fourth, because of the heavy correlation between futures and spot prices (i.e., the
prices actually paid for natural gas), “end users were forced to purchase natural gas at
inflated prices,” i.e., “they were forced to purchase contracts to deliver natural gas in the
[2006] winter months at prices that were disproportionately high when compared to the
plentiful supplies in the market.”31
STRUCTURE, SPECULATION, AND MANIPULATION (August 2006), available at http://www.pulp.tc/Nat_Legal
_Policy_Center_Gas_Manip_August_29_2006.pdf.
27
June 25 Report, supra note 25, at 2.
28
Market Overview, supra note 8.
29
2007 Report, supra note 11, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
30
Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted).
31
Id. at 114.
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Fifth, as reflected in substantial commentary presented to the PSI staff by end
users of natural gas, including, inter alia, the Minnesota Municipal Utilities Association,
the staff concluded that “the lack of transparency in the over-the-counter (OTC) market
for natural gas and the extreme price swings surrounding the fallout of Amaranth have, in
their wake, left bona fide hedgers reluctant to participate in the markets for fear of
locking in prices that may be artificial[ly high].”32
Sixth, the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) bars excessive market speculation
or the “sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes” in the price of
commodities traded on a regulated exchange.33 However, the PSI staff aptly concluded
that there are two critical problems in enforcing that prohibition. First, the PSI staff
found that the CFTC’s enforcement of that prohibition has been very limited in its focus
and “the CFTC and energy exchanges need to reinvigorate the CEA’s prohibition against
excessive speculation.”34 Second, even to the extent that the limited enforcement of the
excessive speculation ban was applied to Amaranth in August 2006 by the NYMEX
exchange, “Amaranth moved those [NYMEX] positions to [the Intercontinental
Exchange or “ICE”].35 Because of the infamous “Enron loophole”36 enacted in
December 2000 as part of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, “ICE, [unlike
NYMEX,] operates with no regulatory oversight, no obligation to ensure its products are
traded in a fair and orderly manner, and no obligation to prevent excessive speculation.”37
“As a result, NYMEX’s instructions to Amaranth did nothing to reduce Amaranth’s size,
but simply caused Amaranth’s trading to move from a regulated market to an unregulated
one.”38 Thus, “[a]lthough both NYMEX and ICE play an integral role in natural gas price
formation, the two exchanges are subject to vastly different regulatory restrictions and
government oversight under current federal law”39 even though “NYMEX and ICE are
functionally equivalent markets.”40
Seventh, the bipartisan 2007 staff report recommends that: (1) the “Enron
loophole” be abolished and that the similarly situated NYMEX and ICE exchanges both
be subject to the protections afforded hedgers and other traders under the CEA; (2) the
excessive speculation ban within the CEA be upgraded and be applied vigorously to both
NYMEX and ICE; and (3) CFTC staffing and technological resources be upgraded to
meaningfully apply the protections of the CEA.41
Observations on the 2007 PSI Staff Report. I would add only the following few
comments to the comprehensive 2007 Report:

32

Id. (internal citation omitted).
7 U.S.C.A. § 6a(a) (2006).
34
2007 Report, supra note 11, at 120.
35
Id.
36
Id. at p. 119; see 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(g), (h)(3) (2006).
37
2007 Report, supra note 11, at 119.
38
Id. at 3.
39
Id. at 40.
40
Id. at 3.
41
Id. at 119-32.
33
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Poorly Considered Enron Loophole. First, it should be emphasized that the
“Enron loophole” – which allows energy futures trading facilities to choose to be
unregulated even though they are functionally equivalent to those exchanges which are
regulated – was far from a carefully considered legislative measure. The loophole was
added at the last minute to a 262 page Senate bill, which was itself belatedly and quite
suddenly attached in a lame duck session on the Senate floor by then Senate Finance
Chairman Gramm to an 11,000 page consolidated appropriation bill for FY 2001.42 Over
the express and emphatic opposition of the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets (including Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers, and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt),43 the Enron loophole exempted OTC
energy derivative markets (even though functionally equivalent to the regulated
exchanges) from CFTC and all other federal regulation.44
This exemption was called the “Enron loophole” because Enron (upon whose
board, Wendy Gramm, Senator Gramm’s wife, then sat) at that time was seeking to
authorize retroactively its now defunct Enron Online energy trading facility, which began
operation even in advance of the passage of the CFMA.45 While this legislation retained
CFTC authority to investigate fraud and manipulation (but not excessive speculation) in
OTC energy markets,46 the CFTC, as a practical matter, read this legislation as generally
constricting its authority to call for regular OTC energy reporting in the absence of preexisting demonstrative evidence of fraud or manipulation. Needless to say, given the last
minute nature of this amendment, there were no hearings, committee reports, or floor
debates justifying this legislation or the reason it should have been passed over the
contrary guidance of Messrs. Greenspan, Summers, and Levitt. As the leading
commentators on derivatives regulation have stated:
“[The CFMA] moved fitfully through the Congress, having been declared
dead on several occasions only to be resurrected at the last minute and enacted by
members of Congress prepared to recess for the Christmas holidays. The most
stunning procedural feature of the CFMA was its lack of legislative history [to]
help resolves ambiguities in legislative drafting. . . .” 47
The Enron Loophole and Western States Electricity Crisis. The “Enron loophole”
almost immediately caused havoc in energy markets. It is now beyond doubt that
manipulation of futures and derivatives contracts pursuant to that loophole dramatically
42

See Sean Gonsalves, Opinion, Enron Exemplifies ‘Genius of Capitalism’, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Jan. 22, 2002, at B5; PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES
REGULATION § 1.01 (3d ed. Supp. 2002).
43
See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 16 (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/reports/otcact.pdf.
44
Edward J. Rosen & Geoffrey B. and Goldman, SWAPs & Other Derivatives in 2001, in THE COMMODITY
FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000, 581-88 (2001).
45
See Jeff Gosmano, Electronic Trading Could Change; Enron Situation Rolls Markets, NATURAL GAS
WEEK, Nov. 12, 2001 (noting Enron Online’s launch in November 1999).
46
Rosen & Goldman, supra note 44, at 585.
47
PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION (2008 Cum. Supp.) at
1.17, p. 27.
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increased the market price of electricity in the Western United States during 2001-2002.
This resulted in needless widespread and rolling blackouts, along with a surge in
corporate bankruptcies during that time period.48 Enron and others, using such
unregulated trading facilities as Enron Online, “gamed” the energy derivatives markets to
drive up the cost of electricity in a manner that bore no relationship to underlying
economic fundamentals.
Between 1999 and 2001, California’s electricity bill rose by more than $40
billion. Because the explanation at that time – as it often is today with the price of oil
and natural gas – was that this sudden and highly disruptive price spike was caused by
economic fundamentals, California and other Western states, as well as energy
dependent public authorities and industries within those states, entered into long term
supply contracts. These contract prices vastly exceeded what history would prove was
the market’s fundamental equilibrium: e.g., long term supply contracts costing $700
million during the electricity crisis would only cost $350 million by March 2002.50
49

Only after internal Enron memos that outlined manipulation strategies were
uncovered in unrelated proceedings did the CFTC begin serious investigations into the
then recently deregulated OTC energy derivatives market. The CFTC ultimately assessed
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and fines for what it found to be widespread,
devastating, and costly futures and derivatives market manipulation in this otherwise
unregulated market.51
The Enron Loophole’s Premium Price. In addition to malpractices in the Western
United States electricity markets, the 2006 bipartisan PSI staff report corroborated
independent economic analysis demonstrating that excessive speculation on unregulated
OTC energy trading facilities has caused (and almost certainly is causing) an estimated
unnecessary $20-30 per barrel increase in the cost of crude oil at the time crude oil was
@ $70 a barrel.52 One can only guess as to what speculation has added to the price of
crude oil now that it is within striking range of $100. That speculation is enough to
prevent OPEC from increasing production only to sell their product into a market where
that increased production only leads to higher prices because of excessive speculation.53
48

See Press Release, Feinstein, Cantwell Press for Public Release of Enron Evidence, Citing Implications
for Oil Markets (May 2, 2006), available at http://feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/r-enron-evidence.pdf.
49
Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, Aftershocks—And Essential Lessons—From the California Electricity
Debacle, 24 ELECTRICITY J. 2003, at 24.
50
148 CONG. REC. S2018-03 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Cantwell); Senators Propose Bill
Regulating OTC Markets, ENERGY COMPASS, Feb. 14, 2002; see also, e.g., Navarro & Shames, supra note
49, at 24 (“[T]he state remains saddled with almost $40 billion of long-term contracts that are roughly
twice the actual market value of the electricity and that will institutionalize high electricity rates in the state
for years to come.”). Similarly, the rising cost of natural gas in the summer of 2006 caused utility
companies to hedge at inflated costs; these costs were then passed on to consumers. See supra text
accompanying notes 8-9.
51
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORTS & TESTIMONY NO. GAO-04-420T, NATURAL GAS:
FACTORS AFFECTING PRICES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS 21 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06420t.pdf.
52
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
53
See Pagnamenta, supra note 20.
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The overwhelming influence of Enron on these unregulated markets is evidenced
by the 2007 PSI report’s finding that when Amaranth in 2002 “added energy trading to its
slate of strategies” to boost its earnings, “it hired several former Enron traders to its
staff.”54 Doubtless those former Enron traders were well educated in the school for
scandal that constituted the Western United States electricity manipulation.
In short, there is every indication that the hastily enacted and poorly examined
Enron loophole has done nothing but add billions of dollars to prices charged the
American consumers for such important everyday commodities as electricity, heating oil,
natural gas, and gasoline. As the PSI staff has recommended, the Enron loophole should
be repealed.
House Republican Efforts to Reregulate Natural Gas Futures Markets
The bipartisan nature of the 2007 PSI staff report is reflective of the widespread
adverse impact the high price of natural gas has had on all sectors of the economy all
over the Nation. In this regard, on December 14, 2005, the then Republican-controlled
House led by Republican Congressman Sam Graves of Missouri, passed, at the behest of
the farming community then suffering from all time record high natural gas prices, a
version of the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 4473), which included a Title
II,55 mandating an aggressive regulatory posture by the CFTC in overseeing “any contract
market” engaged in the trading of natural gas futures and derivatives. At that time, the
cost of natural gas had “float[ed] at a high near $14 MMBtu.”56 Even though the CFTC
reauthorization has yet to make it through Congress, the spot price of natural gas dropped
by roughly one third after Congressman Graves’ December 2005 action and there was
considerable analysis at that time that the mere threat of aggressive regulation of natural
gas futures markets by a Republican controlled House may have been responsible for that
price decline.57
“Foreign Boards of Trade” Run by U.S. Companies Facilitating Unregulated
Trading in U.S. Crude Oil Contracts
Besides the deregulatory effect of the CFMA and that statute’s contribution to the
opaqueness of the deregulated energy futures transactions, there is an informal CFTC
staff process that has evolved into a further obstacle to controlling excessive speculation
and manipulation in energy futures markets: that is, the CFTC staff no action letter
process permitting Foreign Boards of Trade (“FBOT’s”) the right to trade energy futures
products on computer terminals located in the U.S., but be exempt from direct U.S.
regulation.
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The 1996 German Exemption. In February 1996, the CFTC Division of Trading
and Markets (“T&M”), in what appeared at the time to be an action of little consequence,
authorized the German futures exchange, then called the Deutsche Terminborse (DTB),
to allow trading of DTB foreign delivered contracts on computer terminals within the
U.S.58 In what was a surprise to almost everyone, the privilege granted to DTB for U.S.
terminals resulted in a substantial upsurge in that exchange’s business. Shortly thereafter,
virtually all the world’s major FBOT’s desired exemptions from U.S. regulation for the
U.S. trading of foreign delivered futures contracts.
Recognizing the substantial trading that would be done under this kind of
exemption, the CFTC first tried to establish a Commission rule that would govern
regulatory exemptions for these foreign exchanges.59 When the Commissioners could
not promptly agree on such a rule and because of the need quickly to level the playing
field in terms of giving other foreign exchanges the rights given to DTB, it was decided
that T&M would oversee these approvals through a no action letter process.60
The Original Limited Staff No Action Process for FBOT’s. As a result, on July
23, 1999, I signed a no action letter that permitted the principal U.K. futures exchange,
LIFFE, the same rights that had earlier been afforded to DTB.61 There followed a series
of similar no action letters (almost all signed after I left the Commission in September
1999) for other foreign exchanges, including the exchange most relevant to the present
enquiry: the U.K.’s International Petroleum Exchange (“IPE”),62 subsequently purchased
by the U.S.-based Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) in 2001.63
These no action letters were filled with uniform standard conditions carefully
confining the regulatory right afforded. Each of the FBOT’s had to be regulated by a
foreign governmental entity whose regulatory format was akin to that of the CFTC. 64
Assurances had to be received from the FBOT that meaningful information about trades
would be provided the CFTC, especially in situations where there was a concern about
market manipulation. Information sharing arrangements had to be in place assuring the
CFTC that the foreign regulatory authority overseeing the FBOT would provide relevant
information to the CFTC promptly upon request.65 Even more important, a condition was
written into these no action letters that the FBOT itself would “provide, upon the request
of the [CFTC], the . . . Department of Justice, . . . , prompt access to original books and
records maintained at their United States offices . . .”66 Moreover, in these no action
58
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letters, “the [CFTC’s] ability to bring appropriate action for fraud or manipulation” was
retained.67 Finally, the CFTC authority was “retain[ed] to condition further, modify,
suspend, terminate, or otherwise restrict the terms of the no-action relief provided
herein, in [the agency’s] discretion.”68
FBOT U.S.-Delivered Contracts Exempt from Prior CFTC Staff Approval. The
no action letters also specified the precise contracts that could be traded under the
approval.69 Until quite recently, those contracts were always foreign based and not in
direct conflict with U.S. futures contracts traded on U.S. exchanges. Under the original
“no action” template, the FBOT had to seek affirmative approval of T&M before it could
list new contracts.70 In July 2000, that policy was changed to allow FBOT’s to list new
contracts simply by giving notice to the CFTC.71 On the basis of that action, FBOT’s no
longer needed prior CFTC staff approval to list new contracts.
FBOT Approval Was Not for U.S. Controlled Exchanges or U.S. Contracts. When
the no action approval process was instituted in July 1999, there was an intent not to
undercut U.S. exchanges that were fully compliant with, and under the regulatory control
of, the CFTC. By requiring the foreign exchange to list the contracts it would market
under the no action letter and by further requiring the exchange to receive the express
approval of the CFTC if it wanted to add contracts, it was fully understood that the T&M
would not allow a foreign exchange to market contracts that were U.S. denominated or
delivered and directly competitive to those offered by U.S. exchanges. Second, it was
well understood that the FBOT no action process was for exchanges that were
organized in foreign countries. It was never contemplated that the no action process
would apply where a foreign exchange was owned by a U.S. entity.
Therefore, under the original FBOT no action process, both the introduction of
products that were in direct competition with U.S. exchanges or the purchase of an
exempt foreign exchanges by U.S. entities were understood to trigger the immediate
revocation of the no action approval and the requirement that those previously
exchanges register as a U.S. regulated market under the direct auspices of the CFTC.
CFTC Staff Continues FBOT Exemption Even After a U.S. Company Purchases
IPE. Unfortunately, when the IPE was purchased by the Atlanta-based ICE in 2001,
CFTC staff, despite considering four post-acquisition ICE no action letter amendments,
never required that exchange after the acquisition to become a U.S. regulated contract
market. Indeed, this is so even though it is my understanding that ICE has transferred the
67
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bulk of its oil trading platform from the U.K. to computerized trading infrastructure now
located in Atlanta.72
CFTC Staff Continues FBOT Exemption Even After FBOT Facilitates U.S. WTI
Trading. Moreover, in February 2006 by merely serving notice on CFTC staff, ICE began
trading U.S. based futures contracts in direct competition with what had theretofore been
Nymex’s signature and exclusive oil futures contract: the United States West Texas
Intermediate crude oil contract (“WTI”). As of October 2007, ICE had garnered over
33% market share of WTI volume, a futures contract based on crude oil delivery in the
United States.73 ICE now also trades U.S. gasoline and home heating oil contracts.74
Regulatory Arbitrage Caused by U.S. Owned FBOT’s. As the 2006 PSI staff
report so aptly concluded: “This type of unregulated trading of [] U.S. commodit[ies]
from within the United States undermines the very purpose of the Commodity Exchange
Act and the central mission of the CFTC – to prevent manipulation or excessive
speculation of commodity prices ‘to the detriment of the producer or the consumer and
the persons handling the commodities.’”75 According to the most recent public report that
could be obtained, while the CFTC has entered into new (and duplicative) information
sharing arrangements with the U.K. and ICE to conduct surveillance on ICE’s influence
on U.S. commodity markets, “[s]o far, the CFTC has sought only data that are tied to the
[Nymex] natural gas contract” – not to possibly excessively speculative trading taking
place with regard to the U.S. WTI contracts.76
Simple Proposal to End the Enron Loophole
1. The Simplest Enron Loophole Fix. The quickest, most effective way to end the
Enron Loophole is to simply go back to the status quo ante before the Loophole was
passed in December 2000, i.e., treat “energy commodities” the way the CFMA treats
“agricultural commodities,” 7 U.S.C. § 7 (e), and explicitly exclude “energy commodity”
(as the CFMA does for an “agricultural” commodity) from the definition of an “exempt
commodity,”777 U.S. C. § 1a (14), thereby removing energy commodities from the
umbrella of 7 U.S.C.§ 2(h)’s deregulatory ambit and make such trading subject to
Designated Contract Markets (“DCMs”) regulation (as the PWG unanimously
recommended in November 1999).78 This calls for a two word change to two sections of
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the Act, i.e., an “exempt commodity” in § 1a (14) of the Act would exclude “an
agriculture or energy commodity”79; and “agricultural and energy” commodities must be
traded on regulated markets. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (d).
2. The “Safety Valve” of Statutory Exemptive Authority. Under § 4(c) of the Act,
the CFTC may create exemptions from Nymex-like or DCM regulation if it finds any
proposed exemption by a contract market consistent with the public interest and purposes
of the act and the exemption will not have a materially adverse effect on the ability of the
CFTC to discharge regulatory or self regulatory responsibilities. This statutory safety
valve will allow the CFTC to alter Nymex-like regulation in transparent and public
agency proceedings where appropriate.
3. Statutory Regulatory Requirements of a DCM. To the extent trading in OTC
energy commodities becomes part of the Designated Contract Markets (“DCMs”)
process, as is true of agricultural products defined in §1a (14), under the existing
Commodity Exchange Act, those DCMs will adhere, as does Nymex, to the CFMA’s
Core Principles,80 designed to prevent, inter alia, excessive speculation, manipulation or
fraud. Alternatively, the contract market can apply for the lesser (but still protective)
regulation applied to a Derivatives Transaction Execution Facility (“DTEF”) (7 U.S.C. §
7a) if it chooses to only permit trading by sophisticated investors and institutions. Again,
general exemptions from any regulation may be allowed by the CFTC under § 4 (c) of the
Act.
4. FBOT’s Should Neither Be Affiliated with A U.S. Entity Nor Trade U.S.
Delivered Contracts Significantly Affecting Price Discovery. Finally, a new § 2 (j) should
be added to provide expressly:
“No entity or subsidiary of an entity that: (i) is incorporated or has its principal
place of business in the United States; or (ii)) facilitates agreements, contracts, or
transactions that serve a significant price discovery function within the United
States shall be eligible for status as an approved Foreign Board of Trade.”
5. Grace Period. Finally, the bill’s effective date should provide a grace period of
180 days to existing trading facilities that must apply for status as Contract Designated
Market under the new legislation, or for those trading facilities that have applied and are
awaiting approval for that status or a statutory exemption from DCM status.
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING LEGISLATION
TO CLOSE THE ENRON LOOPHOLE
1. No Pending Legislation Designed to End the Enron Loophole Addresses ICE’s
and Its Subsidiary’s Status as a U.K. Regulated Entity for Purpose of West Texas
Intermediate Crude Oil Trading. As the June 2006 SPI report makes clear that are at
present only two major contract markets trading the all important WTI futures contracts:
79
80

See supra note 77.
7 U.S.C.A. § 7(a)-(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).

14

Nymex, which is fully regulated by the CFTC, and ICE’s subsidiary which is regulated
by the U.K. even though its corporate parent is located within the U.S.; its trading
infrastructure is within the U.S.; and it has @ 30% of the contract market in a contract
that indisputably affects the price of, inter alia, crude oil. If “ending the Enron Loophole”
does not impact ICE for purpose of its facilitating WTI crude oil trades, a major
component of the excessive price paid by U.S. citizens and businesses will be totally
unaffected by newly enacted legislation.
2. The ICE WTI Loophole Could Be Ended Immediately by the CFTC without Any
Legislation. Since the FBOT exemption under which ICE evades U.S. regulation is the
product of a CFTC staff no action letter, and since that no action letter includes absolute
rights of termination by the CFTC, the CFTC needs no legislative authority to fix this
loophole, but could immediately ask ICE to show cause why it should not register as a
fully regulated DCM, as is true of Nymex, in order to keep trading the U.S. WTI contract.
Again, because ICE is a U.S. company, with a *U.S. trading infrastructure, and because
the WTI contract significantly affects price discovery in a U.S. market, the CFTC would
be fully within existing statutory authority to insist that ICE register either as a DCM (or
a DTEF) or seek an appropriate exemption from such regulation under the public and
transparent procedures of § 4 (c) of the Act.
3. The Legislation Proposed by the CFTC (and the PWG) to End the Enron
Loophole Puts the Burden on that Agency and the Public through Highly Bureaucratic
Procedures to Stop Soaring Commodity Prices. The CTFC and the President’s Working
Group has only recommended regulating otherwise deregulated futures contracts if an
individual contract “serve[s] a significant price discovery function in order to detect and
prevent manipulation.”81 The proposed definition of a “significant price discovery
function” is narrow and it has been widely reported that, under the CFTC and PWG
analysis, it would only cover a single natural gas contract presently traded by ICE.
4. The CFTC Proposes Lengthy Administrative Proceedings in Which It and the
Public Would Bear the Burden of Proof. Whether its proposed definition of “significant
price discovery function” is broad or narrow, the CFTC under that proposal would have
to engage in a lengthy administrative procedure in which the burden would be on it or
other government or private parties to prove a “significant price discovery function,”
thereby causing self evident agency and litigation-related delays before any antimanipulation controls could be put in place. This regulatory approach differs from the
template underlying the Commodity Exchange Act, i..e., that all futures contracts are
automatically covered by the Act’s protections (i.e., the very nature a publishing the
prices of futures contract is to provide price discovery) unless (1) the proponent of the
contract demonstrates to the CFTC that lesser or no regulation is required under § 4 (c) of
the Act; or (2) the proponent is able to obtain a full statutory exemption, e.g., the Enron
Loophole.82 Of course, virtually everyone agrees that the absolute statutory exemption
afforded by the Enron Loophole must be ended. In short, it is far preferable to just end
that exemption, rather than to play contract-by-contract gamesmanship, and to have those
81
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who believe that they are entitled to regulatory relief bear the burden of proving that
entitlement to the CFTC in a § 4 (c) proceeding.
5. The CFTC Proposal Will Lead to Further Regulatory Arbitrage. Of course, under
the CFTC’s proposed statutory structure, it will not be just the CFTC that will bear the
burden of proving a “significant price discovery function,” but it will be other federal and
state consumer protection agencies and U.S. consumers of the commodity that will have
to join with it (or perhaps even fight it) to prove that point. The CFTC’s structure of
imposing on itself and the public the burden of proving “significant price discovery,” will
be tantamount to a lawyers’ relief act for those who can afford the lawyers to prove this
arcane point. Finally, once lengthy administrative proceedings and related litigation are
ended proving that an individual contract has a “significant price discovery function,”
traders will then employ regulatory arbitrage and they will simply move their trading to
those contracts that remain exempt from regulation as Amaranth did when Nymex
imposed position limits and that hedge fund just moved its trading ICE.
6. The Original Levin Legislation Comes Closest to Effectively Ending the Enron
Loophole. On September 17, 2007, Senator Levin introduced S. 2058,83 the “Close the
Enron Loophole Act.” It does not purport to resolve the CFTC’s dealing with U.S.-based
ICE as an entity regulated by the U.K. when trading U.S. WTI contracts. S. 2058 does
offer a considerable improvement over the CFTC legislative proposal, because it calls for
regulating the entire contract market (not just the contract itself) if the market facilitates
contracts performing a “significant price discovery function.”84 S. 2058 also has a more
developed definition of the “term significant price discovery function;” creates a self
regulatory process for the electronic trading facility on a regulated contract market; and
expressly empowers the CFTC to enforce the closing of the Enron Loophole.85 Finally, S.
2058 also puts the burden on the contract market to apply for regulated status, rather than
relying upon the CFTC to prove that that market or the any contracts on it should be
regulated.86 In other words, a contract market would run the risk of violating Senator
Levin’s proposed statute and of suffering substantial sanctions if it was found not to have
properly registered with the CFTC. This regulatory approach relieves the CFTC and U.S.
commodity consumers from having to bear the expensive burden of proving that there
should be regulation.
7. The Levin/Feinstein Compromise. On October 31, 2007, Senator Feinstein
circulated a draft of legislation entitled the “Prevention of Fraud and Manipulation in
Energy Markets Act.” That legislation included many “reporting” requirements
pertaining to deregulated energy futures contracts, and further provided that an “exempt
commercial market upon which any price determining [energy] contract is presently
executed” shall “be designated as a qualified electronic trading facility” (“QETF”).87 That
proposal does not make clear what entity does that designating or the consequences of
83
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failing to be designated as a QETF. Once designated, a QETF would have to comply with
certain core principals, but far fewer than those required of a designated contract market
under the existing statute, such as those with which Nymex complies.
In any event, in order to ready legislation of this nature as an amendment to
Senate consideration of the Farm Bill, Senators Levin and Feinstein circulated a
compromise version of their legislation on November 14, 2007.88 That compromise
adopts the CFTC’s process of making contract-by-contract determinations of whether an
unregulated contract is a “significant price discovery contract.”89 There is no provision
for regulation of an entire contract market. That tact once again puts the burden back on
the CFTC and the public to prove that there should be regulation with all the attendant
bureaucratic delay and litigation. The contact-by-contract designation would be lengthy
and would encourage regulatory arbitrage. The Levin/Feinstein compromise does give
the CFTC powers to enforce the proposed statute’s provisions.
8. The Easiest Course to End the Enron Loophole Has Not Been Chosen. None of
the pending legislation takes the easiest tact: i.e., return to the status quo ante prior to
passage of the Enron Loophole. First, simply redefine an “exempt” commodity, as the
PWG in 1999 would have done, as not including an energy commodity. With a simple
two word change in two sections of the Act to join “energy” with “agricultural”
commodities, all energy futures trading (as is now true of all agricultural futures trading)
would be done on regulated exchanges unless the contract market demonstrates the need
for a legitimate regulatory exemption to CFTC under § 4 (c) of the Act. Second,
provide that no contract market would be eligible to trade U.S. energy futures contracts as
a foreign board of trade if it is affiliated with a U.S. entity; has its trading engines within
the U.S.; or trades U.S. futures contracts in the United States that have a significant effect
on U.S. energy prices.
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